# 1NC

## off 1

Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action. That undermines preparation and clash. Changing the question now leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow, uneducational debate. Requiring debate on a communal topic forces argument development and develops persuasive skills critical to any political outcome.

Simualted national security law debates inculcate agency and decision-making skills—that enables activism and avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/13, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations.

The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material.

The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos.

The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166

A. Course Design

The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course **was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying** doctrinal **material and** creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking).

Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168

Additionally, **while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage**. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting.

NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux.

A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise.

In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0.

The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law.

Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media).

A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers.

The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed.

The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session.

To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain.

Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced.

Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals.

Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient.

The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future.

B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats

As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. **This is the most important determination, because the substance of the** doctrinal portion of the course and the **simulation follows from this decision**. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. **This**, then, **becomes a guide for the** doctrinal part of the **course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation** are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course.

The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life.

For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like.

The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression.

C. How It Works

As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play.

Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site.

For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis.

The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication.

As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities.

At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively.

Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172

Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests.

CONCLUSION

The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same.

**The one-size fits all approach** currently **dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised** in the current conversation. **Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at** the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach.

With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field.

The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion **simulations**, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may **provide an important way forward**. Such **simulations** also **cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education**, such as clinics and moot court.

It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed **the simulation model** above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it **does provide a** starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. **It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which** they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

## off 2

Demands for presencing of those marked as abject reinscribes the Hegelian dialectic of life and death that makes the social death possible in the first place.

Peterson ‘6

Christopher, “The Return of the Body: Judith Butler's Dialectical Corporealism,” Discourse, 28.2&3, Spring & Fall 2006, pp. 153-177 (Article)

In contemporary cultural studies, the body is laden with intense desires and expectations. Emerging with the eclipse of poststructuralism in the late 1980s, “the body” promised to weigh in on contemporary political debates, to give material substance to a discipline supposedly evacuated by what some felt to **be the excessively linguistic or textual focus** of contemporary theory. But what if the very turn to the body occasioned a certain return of **the metaphysics of presence**, only now bearing the name, or rather, the spirit of “the body”? Indeed, scholars in race, gender, and sexuality studies have often invoked the body as a **marker of both identity and self-presence**. Given the violence of erasure, invisibility, and death (both social and material) to which minority bodies have historically been subjected, it has also seemed to many that the ontology of these bodies must be **insisted upon** in the face of this nihilistic threat. As Sharon Holland announces in Raising the Dead: Readings of Death and (Black) Subjectivity, “bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act.”1 And in the introduction to her seminal, 1991 collection of essays on queer theory, Inside/Out, Diana Fuss notes how “a striking feature of many of the essays collected in this volume is a fascination with the specter of abjection, a certain preoccupation with the figure of the homosexual as specter and phantom, as spirit and revenant, abject and undead.”2 Yet, queer scholarship for the most part has addressed the problem of the spectral only by way of contesting its pervasiveness in dominant representations of homosexuality. If saving us from the shadow of death names the “ultimate queer act,” such so-called “raising” of the dead relieves us of any sustained engagement with what Jacques Derrida calls **spectrality**, understood, in part, as an originary process of mourning that is the condition of all life, indeed, **of any body**. For Derrida, spectrality does not originate with one’s social or biological death. As he argues in a brief reading of Poe’s “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,” our “future” absence divides our present/presence from the very beginning. Derrida takes Valdemar’s catachrestic utterance-—”I have been sleeping-—and now-—now-—I am dead”3-—to make a point about the function of language: My death is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the I. . . . The utterance “I am living” is accompanied by my being-dead and its possibility requires the possibility that I be dead; and conversely. This is not an extraordinary story by Poe here, but the ordinary story of language. . . . I am thus originally means I am mortal.4 While Derrida’s point is that the iterability of a speech act requires the possibility of one’s absence from future scenes of utterance (and thus already implies one’s absence in the present), this living death also names the experience of “being” more generally. As Heidegger puts it, being “is always already dying” in its “beingtowardits-end.”5 For Heidegger, death is not a punctual event that one might mark on a calendar; rather, death always already belongs to our being. The conventional reduction of death to a calculable moment is precisely what Poe’s story parodies. While his doctors assert that his “disease [is] of that character which would admit of exact calculation in respect to the epoch of its termina- tion in death,” Valdemar (aided by the magic of mesmerism) continues to live beyond the estimated moment of decease, a prolongation of dying that allegorizes how life stretches along a path marked at every step by death (51). Valdemar’s protracted dying also echoes Emily Dickinson’s poem “Because I could not stop for death,” in which death “kindly” stops for the speaker and bears her forward through each stage of life. **If**, as in Dickinson’s poem, **death** haunts our “being” from the very beginning, then the spectral condition of sexual minorities is not reducible to a problem of representation, or rather, mis-representation, as queer scholarship tends to suppose. When Holland caricatures “postmodernism” as “the attractive zombie theory of the academy, a place where the living travel through death and are reborn to utter the truths of such a journey,” she suggests that postmodernism articulates a dialectical relation between life and death, a sublation of being and nonbeing that ultimately triumphs over finitude (166). Such a dialectical view of the relation between life and death, however, **opposes** **itself to the spectral**, **which is neither present nor absent**. But perhaps Holland’s caricature is to be expected, for as Derrida notes in Specters of Marx, “the traditional scholar does not believe in ghosts—nor in all that one would call the virtual space of spectrality.” 6 If the traditional scholar does not believe in ghosts, that is because “there has never been a scholar who, as such, did not believe in the clear-cut distinction between the real and the unreal, the actual and the inactual, the living and the non-living, being and non-being” (34). For Derrida, a capacity to speak to “ghosts” would be the mark of a scholar.7 Although it might seem odd to yoke queer critics to the figure of the traditional scholar, so ingrained is the anti-spectral character of queer scholarship that Holland can declare the ultimate queerness of raising the dead as a “fact,” and support this claim only by referring us to ACT UP’s famous political slogan: “**silence = death.”** To insist on this “fact,” however, **is to sidestep the problem of finitude altogether**. When scholars in race, gender, and sexuality studies write about the body, what is typically **invoked is the living body**, **the body that is present to itself, untainted by mortality**. For cultural studies, spectrality is merely an effect of racism, sexism, homophobia, and other social injustices. **Subtracted from** such **external violence**, **the body can be made present,** its ontology no longer in question. But spectrality, as Derrida uses the term (and as I propose to track it here in the context of racial and sexual politics) **does not have its origin in social inequality**. Naming a process of originary mourning that animates corporeal life, spectrality has no proper beginning or end. The abjection that sexual and racial minorities endure might be better understood as a mode of **redoubled ghostliness** that harnesses the spectrality inherent **to all life** and attaches it to those on the margins of sociality: the figure of the gay man dying of AIDS functions as the “proof” of the homophobic white male’s ontological security; the representation of AfricanAmericans as “spooks” (to cite a somewhat antiquated yet illustrative racist epithet) works to ward off the death that **always already haunts** the ontology of the white body.8 No doubt the emergence of gay and lesbian studies in the midst of the AIDS crisis and the cruelty of those discourses that sought to invoke AIDS as further proof of the “death style” of (male) homosexuality inspired many queer critics and theorists to resist the equation of homosexuality and death. Yet, the contestation of this equation, I would argue, has also had the consequence of **disavowing finitude.** My claim is that the specific, historical effects of homophobia, racism, and sexism must also be thought in relation to the generalizable **principle of spectrality**. Certainly there are good reasons to be wary of entertaining general principles, given the risk that they might come to saturate the social and political field, to erase differences altogether. Indeed, the turn to the body has been occasioned by a renewed faith in particularity that often eschews the large claims of “theory.” Yet rejecting general principles altogether risks a certain overparticularization that fails to imagine how the general and the particular might be held in perpetual tension without either finally coming to absorb the other. If “social death” names an ontological deprivation that attends the lives of racial and sexual minorities, there is no reason why these specificities cannot and should not be brought to bear on the generalizable condition of spectrality, and vice versa. Not to negotiate this tension between general and particular, between spectrality and social death, is to miss the opportunity to interrogate **how** the **social death of racial and sexual others** **is produced** in and **through the disavowal of the spectral.** The insistence on the ontology of the socially dead, in other words, merely reverses and reinscribes the division between life and death, presence and absence, that conditions the abjection of queer lives. In a passage from The Psychic Life of Power, for instance, Judith Butler addresses how we might counter the abjection of those bodies deemed expendable, “gay people, prostitutes, drug users, among others . . . [who] are dying or already dead.”9 While she asks us to consider if “‘social existence’” for the majority is purchased through “the production and maintenance of the socially dead,” she does not pursue the question of how the construction of the socially dead is predicated on the **fiction of social being, of being as presence** (PLP 27). Dedicating her work toward expanding “a field of possibilities for bodily life,” she theorizes against the insidious means by which the abjection of minority bodies produces them as “shadowy contentless figure[s] for something not yet made real.”10 **But this invocation of ontology**—**intoned in the suggestion that these ghostly shadows might someday be embodied**— would appear to conflate social death or abjection with what we are calling spectrality. **This conflation denies the possibility of the specter**, of that which is neither spirit nor body. As Derrida notes in Specters of Marx: “For there is no ghost, there is never any becoming specter of the spirit without at least an appearance of flesh. . . . For there to be a ghost, there must be a return to a body, but to a body that is more abstract than ever” (202). Although the possibility of the specter requires a certain return to the body, that body never fully returns to itself. Indeed, the return of the body to itself is forever deferred by its “hauntological” condition. Following Derrida, we might consider that all bodies live in the “shadowy regions of ontology,” **all bodies are hauntological**, not ontological. Only by virtue of the fiction of ontology do certain bodies appear to be more present than others. The social existence of the majority, of those white, male bodies that supposedly matter, is conditioned by a certain **disavowal and projection** **of** the body’s **finitude**. The socially dead are thus made to stand in for the death that haunts each and every life. While the interrogation of the body as a stable marker of identity would appear to have received its most well-known and persistent challenge in Butler’s anti-epistemological accounts of corporeality, **the equation of the body with presence remains very much intact.** Indeed, I would suggest that, despite the frequent characterization of her theorizations of corporeality as “deconstructive” by both her supporters and her most virulent critics (Nussbaum or ˇZizˇek for instance), they remain squarely within a metaphysical tradition of presence that disavows finitude, that is, within that very tradition that deconstruction has made it its mission to displace.11

Disawoval of finitude is the foundational condition for all American violence—the impact is ever-escalating cycles of destruction.

Peterson ‘7

Christopher, *Kindred Specters*: *Death, Mourning and American Affinity*, University of Minnesota Press

The popularity of Six Feet Under notwithstanding, American culture tends not to acknowledge the intimate relation among death, mourning, and kinship —no doubt because in the modern West we tend to see the barrier that separates the living and the dead as insurmountable. If we follow historian Philippe Aries on this subject, however we see that things were not always so. In contrast to the Middle Ages, in which a certain familiarity with death was displayed, a promiscuous coexistence of the living and the dead, Aries argues that the rise of **modernity witnessed an effacement and interdiction of death**. Death was to be put in its proper place, whether Its place" be the newly constructed cemeteries on the outside of the city walls or the hospitals where patients now came to die rather than to get well: "Mourning is thus no longer a necessary period on which society imposes respect. It has become a morbid state that needs to be nurtured, abridged, and erased.'!^ According to Aries, the interdiction of mourning is **nowhere more vigilant than** **in the** U**nited** S**tates,** where death is treated almost as an aberration of life. Indeed, the present study focuses on American culture precisely because the American disavowal of death is **so vehement**. Aries reads the advent of the mortuary business and the practice of embalming in the United States during the late nineteenth century as a testament to the American denial of mortality. Death could no longer be either too familiar or common, too frightening or painful: "To sell death, one must make it pleasant" (69). This transformation of death into something pleasant—in other words, something that is not death—is symptomatic of the modern segregation of the living and the dead. Following Aries, Gary Laderman traces the emergence of this peculiarly modern interdiction of death specifically to the postbellum era, which bore witness to the "birth of the death industry."^ During the Civil War, a doctor by the name of Thomas Holmes claimed to have embalmed thousands of fallen soldiers. Because most Civil War battles were fought on Southern land, the practice of embalming allowed for the preservation and repatriation of the bodies of fallen Union soldiers. Following the wartime emergence of embalming, Abraham Lincoln became the first U.S. president to have his body embalmed. Lincoln's body, as is well known, was paraded before thousands of mourning citizens on a long, cross-country journey from Washington, D.C. to Springfield, Illinois. As Laderman notes, the parading of Lincoln's body "ensured that embalming—an unacceptable treatment before the war—would change the practice of American deathways" (163). The living could now "look at the face of death and not be confronted by the gruesome details of decomposition and decay" (174). As Jessica Mitford observed in her well-known expose of the American funeral industry, The American Way of Death (1963), the undertaker "put[s] on a well-oiled performance in which the concept of death...play[s] no part whatsoever....He and his team...score an upset victory over death. While this study accords with the claim that American culture disavows mortality, I do not argue for any simple reversal of this interdiction with an aim toward affirming finitude per se. If death is beyond our experience (as Heidegger among others has observed), if I am ultimately absent from "my" own death, then strictly speaking there is nothing for me to recognize or avow. Yet **dying is something that I do every day**. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that American culture disavows dying, understood as a process that extends from our birth to our biological demise.^ Even with such an amended formulation, however, it is not entirely clear whether dying can ever be fully affirmed or avowed. That "we live as if we were not going to die," as Zygmunt Bauman observes, "is a remarkable achievement," especially given the ease with which we disavow dying on a daily basis/ Some degree of disavowal would seem both unavoidable and necessary for our survival. Any effort to prolong one's life, from simply eating well and exercising to taking medications to prevent or treat illness, evidences this disavowal. For Bauman, however, **the disavowal of dying often has** violent **political and social** consequences. Noting the wartime imperative "to limit **our** casualties,'" for instance, Bauman remarks that ::the price of that limiting **is multiplying the dead on the other side** of the battleline" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that death is "socially managed "by securing the Immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others (35, his emphasis).1^ The belief in my self-presence, which is also always a belief in my immortality, is thus **dialectically conditioned** by the nonpresence of others. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead—both figuratively and literally. Indeed, this gesture both accompanies and reinforces the larger cultural dissimulation of mortality by making **racial** and **sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life**. The history of American slavery tells a familiar story of how American consciousness disavows and projects mortality onto its ''others." Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."^ For Patterson, slavery—across its various historical forms—emerges as a substitute for death, a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. As a substitution for death, slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death," for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that the presumptive ontology of slave-owning, legally recognized kinship, was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself. Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, ::for a people who made much of their newness'—their potential, freedom, and innocence—it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is."^ For Morrison, African-American slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness did not so much threaten the ostensible "newness" of American life as it conditioned the latter's appearance as new and free. Hence "freedom," she writes, "has no meaning...without the specter of enslavement" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's infamous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field.From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side"—so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls "spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations— noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife —would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, 'for cultures that fear death...necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror" (5). American necrophilia, according to Castronovo, responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death. Castronovo thus aims to turn us away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife toward "specific forms of corporeality," such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body, in order to avoid "reinserting] patterns of abstraction" (17). Yet, this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body," and therefore of a **self-contained, self-present entity**. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, it does not follow that a move toward embodiment remedies such a spiritualized politics. Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body "does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether—as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is also legible in Sharon Holland's Raising the Dead, which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."^ Drawing from the activist slogan "silence=death" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally, Holland observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable" (38). Yet, as in Castronovo's critique of necropolitics, **this imperative to "raise the dead"** reverses **rather than** **displaces** the logic through which dominant, white, heterosexual culture disavows and projects mortality onto racial and sexual minorities. While we must address the particular effects that social death has on racial and sexual minorities, this social reality must also be thought in relation to a more generalizable principle of mourning. For the "shadow of death" haunts all lives, not just queer ones. The "ultimate queer act," pace Holland, would be to deconstruct rather than reinscribe the binary between life and death**, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of finitude.**

The alternative is to vote negative to endorse the politics of spectrality. This shatters the Hegelian dialectic of presence that sustains all violence against the abject.

Peterson ‘6

Christopher, “The Return of the Body: Judith Butler's Dialectical Corporealism,” Discourse, 28.2&3, Spring & Fall 2006, pp. 153-177 (Article)

Precarious Bodies

A return to ontology in Precarious Life is also legible in its tendency to reduce corporeal vulnerability to the threat of external violence. Certainly the events of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq serve as devastating reminders of the body’s mortality. But corporeal vulnerability does not have its origin in external violence. Corporeal vulnerability does not commence with our exposure to others. The body’s **finitude**, its spectrality, **is inherent**. As Freud puts it, however, “at bottom no one believes in his own death. . . . Every one of us is convinced of his own immortality.”35 The political stratification that positions the socially alive against the socially dead thus also describes the unequal distribution of mortality/immortality more generally.36 If no one believes in his or her own death, then death always “happens” to others. As Heidegger observes, the recognition that “‘one dies’ spreads the opinion that death, so to speak, strikes the they” (234). For Heidegger, however, the futural “not yet” that attends the “certain” but “indeterminate” possibility of death denies how being is always “ahead of itself” in its anticipation of death. Hence, while the move from the living body to the precarious body begins to address the problem of finitude so largely absent from Butler’s earlier work, her tendency to reduce finitude to the problem of external threat and violence does not awaken to the originary mourning that haunts all bodies. **Avowing mortality** and mourning might not only forestall the violent response to 9/11, but could also challenge the reduction of America’s “internal” racial and sexual others to the liminal status of social death. The construction of the Muslim other as always already dead describes but the most recent version of a long American tradition that secures the “immortality” of the “majority” at the expense of the mortalization of the nation’s racial and sexual others. 37 Indeed, the belief that “death strikes others” is most violently felt in the domain of racial and sexual politics. What I have been calling the “redoubled ghostliness” of racial and sexual minorities describes an intimate contact with both social and material death. As Karla Holloway observes in Passed on: African-American Mourning Stories, black Americans are unusually at risk for an “untimely death,” from specific forms of racial violence, such as lynching and capital punishment, to all varieties of disease.38 Given the homophobic equation of homosexuality and death that has characterized the response to the AIDS crisis, sexual minorities also bear the burden of the death that heterosexist culture denies. Without diminishing the reality of this heightened proximity to death, however, **we must also recognize that finitude**—as a generalizable condition of existence—**always comes “before its time**.” While some of us are socially dead, we are all specters. If self-presence is always tied to the belief in one’s immortality, then **only a theory that dislodges corporeality from the present** **can challenge the unacknowledged belief that death is what happens to others.** “The ultimate queer act”—to modify Holland’s assertion with which we began—would be finally to displace the dialectic of being/non-being, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of spectrality through which the abjection of queers both emerges and is sustained.

## off 3

The role of the ballot is which team best provides a method for the debate cityspace, and the people within it, to address the issue of white supremacy in debate.

The ideal of community creates scapegoating and exclusion based on race, sex and class. even radical reappropriation fails in this context – it’s best to ditch the concept altogether

Young 90

IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237-38 (1990).

Iris Marion Young (2 January 1949 - 1 August 2006) was Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies [1] and the Human Rights program there. Her research covered contemporary political theory, feminist social theory, and normative analysis of public policy.

I have argued that the ideal of community denies the difference between subjects and the social differentiation of temporal and spatial distancing. The most serious political consequence of the desire for community, or for coprcsence and mutual identification with others, is that it often operates to exclude or oppress those experienced as different. Commitment to an ideal of community tends to value and enforce homogeneity (cf. Hirsch, 1986). In ordinary speech in the United States, the term community refers to the people with whom one identifies in a specific locale. It refers to neighborhood, church, schools. It also carries connotations of ethnicity, race, and other group identifications. For most people, insofar as they consider themselves members of communities at all, a community is a group that shares a specific heritage, a common self- identification, a common culture and set of norms. Self-identification as a member of such a community also often occurs as an oppositional differentiation from other groups, who are feared, despised, or at best devalued. Persons feel a sense of mutual identification only with some persons, feel in community only with those, and fear the difference others confront them with because they identify with a different culture, history, and point of view on the world. The ideal of community, I suggest, validates and reinforces the fear and aversion some social groups exhibit toward others. If community is a positive norm, that is, if existing together with others in relations of mutual understanding and reciprocity is the goal, then it is understandable that we exclude and avoid those with whom we do not or cannot identify. Richard Sennett (1970, chap. 2) discusses how a "myth of community" operates perpetually in American society to produce and implicitly legitimate racist and classist behavior and policy. In many towns, suburbs, and neighborhoods people do have an image of their locale as one in which people all know one another, have the same values and life style, and relate with feelings of mutuality and love. In modern American society such an image is almost always false; while there may be a dominant group with a distinct set of values and life style, within any locale one can usually find deviant individuals and groups. Yet the myth of community operates strongly to produce defensive exclusionary behavior: pressuring the Black family that buys a house on the block to leave, beating up the Black youths who come into "our" neighborhood, zoning against the construction of multiunit dwellings. The exclusionary consequences of valuing community, moreover, are not restricted to bigots and conservatives. Many radical political organizations founder on the desire for community. Too often people in groups working for social change take mutual friendship to be a goal of the group, and thus judge themselves wanting as a group when they do not achieve such commonality (see Mansbridge, 1980, chap. 21; Breines, 1982, csp. chap. 4). Such a desire for community often channels energy away from the political goals of the group, and also produces a clique atmosphere which keeps groups small and turns potential members away. Mutual identification as an implicit group ideal can reproduce a homogeneity that usually conflicts with the organization's stated commitment to diversity. In recent years most socialist and feminist organizations, for example, have taken racial, class, age, and sexual diversity as an important criterion according to which the success of political organizations should be evaluated. To the degree that they take mutual understanding and identification as a goal, they may be deflected from this goal of diversity. The exclusionary implications of a desire for face-to-face relations of mutual identification and sharing present a problem for movements asserting positive group difference fflhe effort of oppressed groups to reclaim their group identity, and to form with one another bonds of positive cultural affirmation around their group specificity, constitutes an important resistance to the oppression of cultural imperialism. It shifts the meaning of difference from otherness and exclusion to variation and specificity, and forces dominant groups to acknowledge their own group specificity. But does not such affirmation of group identity itself express an ideal of community, and is it not subject to exclusionary impulses. Some social movements asserting positive group difference have found through painful confrontation that an urge to unify and mutual identification does indeed have exclusionary implications. Feminist efforts to create women's spaces and women's culture, for example, have often assumed the perspective of only a particular subgroup of women - white, or middle class, or lesbian, or straight – thus implicitly excluding or rendering invisible those women among them with differing identifications and experiences (Spelman, 1988). Similar problems arise for any movement of group identification, because in our society most people have multiple group identifications, and thus group differences cut across every social group. These arguments against community arc not arguments against the political project of constructing and affirming a positive group identity and relations of group solidarity, as a means of confronting cultural imperialism and discovering things about oneself and others with whom one feels affinity. Critique of the ideal of community, however, reveals that even in such group-specific contexts affinity cannot mean the transparency of selves to one another. If in their zeal to affirm a positive meaning of group specificity people seek or try to enforce a strong sense of mutual identification, they arc likely to reproduce exclusions similar to those they confront. Those affirming the specificity of a group affinity should at the same time recognize and affirm the group and individual differences within the group.

The concept of community connects to the worst genocides of the 20th century

Pavlich 1

Restorative justice and civil society By Heather Strang, John Braithwaite UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, Professor of Law and Sociology PhD (Sociology) 1992 University of British Columbia

Indeed, the quest for a clearly defined community **always** contains the seeds of exclusionary parochialism that can lead, and has in the past led to atrocious totalitarian exclusions. Let us not forget that the 'community' featured prominently in the diverse hierarchies established under the auspices of national socialist, apartheid and Stalinist calculations of solidarity (Anderson, 1991). Indeed, images of community have featured prominently among social calculations behind the most horrific catastrophes of the twentieth century; the **mass slaughters** of nationalistic warfare, **genocidal imperialisms**, the **gas chambers, ethnic cleansing, apartheid torture**, and so the list goes on. Under certain circumstances, that is, the quest for community has proved more than capable of unleashing an obsession **with member purity**, **xenophobia, and an extreme focus on excluding traces of the 'other'**, the 'strange', and so on. This reminder should put to rest the idea that imposing images of community over relations between people is an innocuous, or inherently positive, set of events.

Community actively attempts to impose homogeneity. We should instead work within a frame of urban acceptance of difference–the alternative solves the aff better

Young 90

IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237-38 (1990).

Iris Marion Young (2 January 1949 - 1 August 2006) was Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies [1] and the Human Rights program there. Her research covered contemporary political theory, feminist social theory, and normative analysis of public policy.

Many philosophers and political theorists criticize welfare capitalist society for being atomistic, depoliticized, fostering self-regarding interest-group pluralism and bureaucratic domination. The most common alternative vision offered by such critics is an ideal of community. Spurred by appeals to community as an alternative to liberal individualism made by Michael Sandel, Alasdair Maclntyre, and others, in recent years political theorists have debated the virtues and vices of communitarianism as opposed to liberalism (Gutmann, 1985; Hirsch, 1986; Buchanan, 1989). Many socialists, anarchists, feminists, and others critical of welfare capitalist society formulate their vision of a society free from domination and oppression in terms of an ideal of community. Much of this discussion would lead us to think that liberal individualism and communitarianism exhaust the possibilities for conceiving social relations. ... I share many of the communitarian criticisms of welfare capitalist liberal democratic theory and society. I shall argue [here), however, that the ideal of community **fails** to offer an appropriate alternative vision of a democratic polity. The ideal of community exemplifies the logic of identity—This ideal expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects with one another which in practice operates to exclude those with whom the group does not identify. The ideal of community **denies and represses social difference**, the fact that the polity cannot be thought of as a unity in which all participants share a common experience and common values. In its privileging of face-to-face relations, moreover, the ideal of community denies difference in the form of the temporal and spatial distancing that characterizes social process. As an alternative to the ideal of community, I develop in this chapter an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference. As a normative ideal, city life **instantiates social relations of difference without exclusion**. Different groups dwell in the city alongside one another, of necessity interacting in city- spaces. If city politics is to be democratic and not dominated by the point of view of one group, it must be a politics that takes account of and provides voice for the different groups that dwell together in the citv without forming a community.

## DA

\ The aff expands precedent against indefinite detention—that destroys military operations

Ford, 10

(Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, currently serving as the Staff Judge Advocate, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, “Keeping Boumediene off the Battlefield: Examining Potential Implications of the Boumediene v. Bush Decision to the Conduct of United States Military Operations,” 30 Pace L. Rev. 396, Winter, Lexis)

Boumediene, and the potential extension of its holding, impacts U.S. detention operations not only at Guantanamo Bay but also at Bagram and other current or future detention facilities. As a preliminary matter, the natural question in light of Boumediene is how necessary or beneficial is Guantanamo Bay? If the DoD initially established Guantanamo Bay for its foreign location - more convenient for U.S.-based intelligence and interrogation personnel - then, in light of Boumediene, the base is no longer "foreign." The purported freedom from domestic legal requirements initially presumed at Guantanamo no longer exists. As the current administration seeks to close Guantanamo n48 - whether due to legal, political, or policy reasons - it is clear that Boumediene has done away with at least one benefit of housing detainees at Guantanamo. Could Boumediene impact current detention activities in Bagram? If Boumediene reaches that facility, the Eisentrager Court's worst fears would be realized. n49 Military interrogations [\*412] might require court approval, or worse, the presence of a detainee's counsel. Moving a detainee may likewise require approval from the court. Conditions of confinement might be reviewable by a court. Military prison guards may be liable to their enemy captives in constitutional tort. The implications, again, are vast. In addition to detention operations in a theater of war, Boumediene may **directly impact actual day-to-day combat operations**. Justice Scalia warned that Boumediene could "cause more Americans to be killed." n50 Practically speaking, he was referring to a situation where a court releases a terrorist who returns to fight against Americans. Additionally, battlefield impact and risk to service members for other reasons is not improbable. As a preliminary matter, the issue arises in determining when habeas rights attach. Habeas would attach on the battlefield only if the United States exercises functional control over a combatant - that is, if it exercises the functional equivalent of legal sovereignty over the detainee. In a country like Afghanistan, or even Iraq, there is no question that functioning governments active in inter-and intra-state affairs are operating, and the nations maintain their sovereignty. But does (or would) the United States operate in a pocket or umbrella of sovereignty in either nation for purposes of Boumediene? Liberal stationing agreements, UNSCRs, or other documents authorizing or defining the scope and breadth of authority for U.S. forces in a country could be read to grant Boumediene-like autonomy. During the heightened occupation of Iraq, and the initial invasion of Afghanistan, a stronger argument could have been made that habeas in fact attached to [\*413] in-country detentions. And, in a certain area of occupation, such as post-war Germany, or immediately following invasive hostilities, the case is again much closer. If a U.S. soldier operates in a pocket of sovereignty, habeas rights may attach to any enemy he seizes or captures on the battlefield. Those rights would remain during temporary detention, transfer, and long-term detention. In this (hopefully unlikely) situation, U.S. combat troops would have to be trained in the latest version of habeas law for the battlefield. They would need to know not only the operational requirements and details of the military operation - for example, seizing terrain or raiding a compound - but also the legal niceties associated with capturing an enemy who has constitutional rights and seizing the evidence that might be necessary to keep that enemy in detention and off of future battlefields. At the very least, these new requirements would be a distraction to an undertaking where focus and attention to detail are vital, a distraction that could be deadly. Essentially, troops on patrol would be carrying the full panoply of rights and privileges afforded under the U.S. Constitution in their assault packs. Every enemy encountered would be entitled to rummage through the pack to choose the U.S. domestic law - the legal weapon n51 - to use against the soldier. In effect, the military operation would be converted into a pseudo-law enforcement search and seizure operation. U.S. combat troops would be no different than police officers on patrol in any town or city in the United States. **The military would cease to exist as we know it** and would become nothing more than a deployable F.B.I. As indicated above, evidence experts and/or law enforcement experts may be integrated into the operation. These individuals are likely not familiar with military operations and have not trained with the unit to which they would be assigned. The potential for confusion, hesitation, mistaken identity, and uncertainty is great. Each creates a **recipe for fratricide, enemy advantage**, or worse - **mission failure and defeat.**

Nuclear war

Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon 7, Fred’s a resident scholar at AEI, Michael is a senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April, <http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf>

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, SinoTaiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

## case

Their ethics collapses never reaches a concrete stopping point – causes genocide

David R. **Schmahmann and** Lori J. **Polacheck**, a partner in the firm of Nutter, McLennan & Fish, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, SPRING, **95**

In the end, however, it is the aggregate of these characteristics that does render humans fundamentally, importantly, and unbridgeably different from animals, even though it is also beyond question that in individual instances -- for example, in the case of vegetative individuals -- some animals may indeed have higher cognitive skills than some humans. To argue on that basis alone, however, that human institutions are morally flawed because they rest on assumptions regarding the aggregate of human abilities, needs, and actions is to deny such institutions the capacity to draw any distinctions at all. Consider the consequences of a theory which does not distinguish between animal life and human life for purposes of identifying and enforcing legal rights. Every individual member of every species would have recognized claims against human beings and the state, and perhaps other animals as well. As the concept of rights expanded to include the "claims" of all living creatures, the concept would lose much of its force, and human rights would suffer as a consequence. Long before Singer wrote Animal Liberation, one philosopher wrote:  If it is once observed that there is no difference in principle between the case of dogs, cats, or horses, or stags, foxes, and hares, and that of tsetse-flies or tapeworms or the bacteria in our own blood-stream, the conclusion likely to be drawn is that there is so much wrong that we cannot help doing to the brute creation that it is best not to trouble ourselves about it any more at all. The ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow men [sic], because the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to treat the [\*753] brutes like human beings, but that there is no good reason why we should not treat human beings like brutes. Extension of this principle leads straight to Belsen and Buchenwald, Dachau and Auschwitz, where the German and the Jew or Pole only took the place of the human being and the Colorado beetle. 26

**Structural violence focus turns the aff - Focus on guilt-based pancea politics leads to compassion fatigue that results in a net-decrease in ethical acts**

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It all started with an advertising campaign. We have all been cued by that famous series of ads by Save the Children. You can help this child or you can turn the page. The first time a reader sees the advertisement he is arrested by guilt. He may come close to actually sending money to the organization. The second time the reader sees the ad he may linger over the photograph, read the short paragraphs of copy and only then turn the page. The third time the reader sees the ad he typically turns the page without hesitation. The fourth time the reader sees the ad he may pause again over the photo and text, not to wallow in guilt, but to acknowledge with cynicism how the advertisement is crafted to manipulate readers like him— even if it is in a “good” cause. As the Chicago Tribunes 1998 series investigating four international charities bluntly stated, “Child sponsorship is one of the most powerful and seductive philanthropic devices ever conceived.” 7 Most media consumers eventually get to the point where they turn the page. Because most of us do pass the advertisement by, its curse is on our heads. “Either you help or you turn away,” stated one ad. “Whether she lives or dies, depends on what you do next.” Turning away kills this child. We are responsible. “Because without your help, death will be this child’s only relief.” 8 In turning away we become culpable. But we can’t respond to every appeal. And so we’ve come to believe that we don’t care. If we turn the page originally because we don’t want to respond to what is in actuality a fund-raising appeal, although in the guise of a direct humanitarian plea, it becomes routine to thumb past the pages of news images showing wide-eyed children in distress. We’ve got compassion fatigue, we say, as if we have involuntarily contracted some kind of disease that we’re stuck with no matter what we might do. But it’s not just the tactics of the advocacy industry which are at fault in our succumbing to this affliction. After all, how often do we see one of their ads, anyway?…unless it’s Christmastime and we’re opening all our unsolicited mail. It’s the media that are at fault. How they typically cover crises helps us to feel overstimulated and bored all at once. Conventional wisdom says Americans have a short attention span. A parent would not accept that pronouncement on a child; she would step in to try to teach patience and the rewards of sticktoitiveness. But the media are not parents. In this case they are more like the neighborhood kid who is the bad influence on the block. Is your attention span short? Well then, let the media give you even more staccato bursts of news, hyped and wired to feed your addiction. It is not that there’s not good, comprehensive, responsible reporting out there. There is. “Sometimes,” said the late Jim Yuenger, former foreign editor with the Chicago Tribune, “you put the news in and people just aren’t going to read it and you have to say the hell with it.” 9 But that type of coverage is expensive as well as spaceand time-consuming. It rarely shows enough bang for the buck. So only a few elite media outlets emphasize such coverage, and even they frequently lapse into quick once-over reporting. “We give you the world,” yes, but in 15-second news briefs. The print and broadcast media are part of the entertainment industry— an industry that knows how to capture and hold the attention of its audience. “The more bizarre the story,” admitted UPI foreign editor Bob Martin, “the more it’s going to get played.” 10 With but a few exceptions, the media pay their way through selling advertising, not selling the news. So the operating principle behind much of the news business is to appeal to an audience— especially a large audience— with attractive demographics for advertisers. Those relatively few news outlets that consider international news to be of even remote interest to their target audiences try to make the world accessible. The point in covering international affairs is to make the world fascinating— or at least acceptably convenient: “News you can use.” “When we do the readership surveys, foreign news always scores high,” said Robert Kaiser, former managing editor of The Washington Post. “People say they’re interested and appreciate it, and I know they’re lying but I don’t mind. It’s fine. But I think it’s an opportunity for people to claim to be somewhat better citizens than they are.” 11 But in reality, they’re bored. When problems in the news can’t be easily or quickly solved— famine in Somalia, war in Bosnia, mass murder of the Kurds— attention wanders off to the next news fashion. “What’s hardest,” said Yuenger, “is to sustain interest in a story like Bosnia, which a lot of people just don’t want to hear about.” The media are alert to the first signs in their audience of the compassion fatigue “signal,” that sign that the short attention span of the public is up. “If we’ve just been in Africa for three months,” said CBS News foreign editor Allen Alter, “and somebody says, ‘You think that’s bad? You should see what’s down in Niger,’ well, it’s going to be hard for me to go back. Everybody’s Africa’d out for the moment.” As Milan Kundera wrote in The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, “The bloody massacre in Bangladesh quickly covered over the memory of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the assassination of Allende drowned out the groans of Bangladesh, the war in the Sinai Desert made people forget Allende, the Cambodian massacre made people forget Sinai and so on and so forth, until ultimately everyone lets everything be forgotten.” 12 The causes of compassion fatigue are multiple. Sometimes there are just too many catastrophes happening at once. “I think it was the editor Harold Evans,” said Bill Small, former president of NBC News and UPI, “who noted that a single copy of the [London] Sunday Times covers more happenings than an Englishman just a few hundred years ago could be expected to be exposed to in his entire lifetime.” 13 In 1991, for instance, it was hard not to be overwhelmed by the plethora of disasters. So compassion fatigue may simply work to pre-empt attention of “competing” events. Americans seem to have an appetite for only one crisis at a time. The phenomenon is so well-known that even political cartoonists make jokes about it, such as the frame drawn by Jeff Danziger of a newsroom with one old hack saying to someone on the phone: “Tajikistan? Sorry, we’ve already got an ethnic war story,” and another old warhorse saying on another phone: “Sudan? Sorry we’ve already got a famine story.” 14 Even during “slower” disaster seasons, there is always a long laundry list of countries and peoples in upheaval. Many and perhaps most of the problems are not of the quick-fix variety— the send-in-the-blankets-and-vaccination-suppliesand-all-will-be-well emergencies. Most global problems are entrenched and longlasting, rarely yielding to easy solutions available to individuals or even NGO and governmental authorities. “The same theme just dulls the psyche. For the reader, for the reporter writing it, for the editor reading it,” said Bernard Gwertzman, former foreign editor at The New York Times. 15 Tom Kent, international editor at the Associated Press, noted the same problem in covering ongoing crises. “Basically, in our coverage we cover things until there’s not much new to say. And then we back off daily coverage and come back a week or a month later, but not day-to-day.” He could tell, he said, when the sameness of the situation was drugging an audience into somnolence. We can certainly get a sense for the degree that people care about a story in the public. For example, when Bosnia started, people were calling up all the time for addresses of relief organizations and how we can help and all that. We did lists, and then requests dropped off. And in the first part of the Somalia story we heard “How can we help?” “How can we get money to these people?” We sent out the lists, then those calls dropped off Either the people who wanted to contribute had all the information they needed, or there just wasn’t anybody else who was interested. In Rwanda, we got practically no inquiries about how to help, although our stories certainly suggested there’s as much misery in Rwanda as anywhere else. 16 Sometimes to Americans, international problems just seem too permanent to yield to resolution. Sometimes even when problems flare out into crisis— by which point it is too late for the patch-’em-up response— the public is justified in believing that outside intervention will do little good…so what’s the use in caring? It’s difficult for the media and their audience to sustain concern about individual crises over a period of months and maybe even years. Other more decisive— and short-term— events intervene, usurping attention, and meanwhile, little seems to change in the original scenario. There is a reciprocal circularity in the treatment of low-intensity crises: the droning “same-as-it-ever-was” coverage in the media causes the public to lose interest, and the media’s perception that their audience has lost interest causes them to downscale their coverage, which causes the public to believe that the crisis is either over or is a lesser emergency and so on and so on. Another, especially pernicious form of compassion fatigue can set in when a crisis seems too remote, not sufficiently connected to Americans’ lives. Unless Americans are involved, unless a crisis comes close to home— either literally or figuratively— unless compelling images are available, preferably on TV, crises don’t get attention, either from the media or their audience. Some of the public may turn the television off when they see sad reports from around the world, but unless the news is covered by the media, no one has an opportunity to decide whether to watch or not. “Thanks to the news media,” noted Newsweek, “the face of grieving Kurdish refugees replaced the beaming smiles of victorious GIs.” Publicity, Newsweek argued, “galvanized the public and forced the president’s hand.” In just two weeks, the Bush administration sent $188 million in relief to the Kurds. 17 It’s a bit like that tree falling in the middle of the forest. If it falls and no one hears, it’s like it never happened. The tree may lie on the forest floor for years, finally to rot away, without anyone ever realizing it once stood tall.

# 2NC

## Spectrality

Turns the case—denial of finitude reinscribes American exceptionalism

Luciano ‘12

Dana, Georgetown University, Book review: Kindred Specters:Death,Mourning, and American Affinity. Christopher Peterson. Minneapolis:University ofMinnesota Press, 2007. Pp. ixþ188,

The book opens with an extensive introductory chapter outlining the shape of the argument about kinship. Peterson takes to task a number of Americanist critics—Russ Castronovo, Sharon Holland, Orlando Patterson, Abdul Jan Mohamed—who have addressed the question of social death, particularly the social death of black Americans. These critics’ failure to grapple with the **universality of death’s burden**, Peterson charges, ultimately **links their work to the project of American exceptionalism**, **the desire to escape time and disavow finitude**. Instead, Peterson proposes, criticism should trouble the boundary between life and death and between those subjects who are understood to be marked by death and others whose denial of dying orders that marking. Peterson’s readings of Chesnutt, Morrison, and Faulkner proceed in light of this affirmation, tracing the ways that appropriation and violence inhere within, and in fact work to construct, the intimate bonds of kinship. The chapter on Chesnutt, ‘‘Giving up the Geist,’’ centers on a handful of tales drawn from The Conjure Woman (1899). Reading the tales together, Peterson explores how both the elderly freedman who narrates the tales, Uncle Julius, and the ‘‘goophered’’ slaves whose stories he recollects for John, the white Northerner who has purchased the land on which the plantation once stood, collectively manage to resist their condition by embracing a spectral conception of corporeality, which insists on maintaining difference against the claim of identity that enables the master’s appropriation of the slave’s body. The second chapter, ‘‘Beloved ’s Claim,’’ examines the violence of kinship in proximity to the intersection of kinship and property that characterized the slave system. Peterson’s reading of Morrison’s 1987 novel counters the sentimental reception of Sethe’s killing her children as ‘‘an act of pure, motherly love’’ (74). This response, he claims, ignores the violence that characterizes the mother/child bond and, indeed, any relation to the other, even that of affection; he asserts, ‘‘it is thanks to violence, to the always impure relation to the other, that we have love’’ (79). Beloved ’s simultaneous positing and undoing of the sacralized maternal bond point toward an ethical mode of relation to the other, a dispossessive relation in which the other can neither be fully claimed nor fully mourned, but in which some unincorporated trace is permitted to remain.

It’s impossible—the specter cannot be assimilated into the logic of presence

Peterson ‘7

Christopher, *Kindred Specters, Death, Mourning, and American Affinity*, University of Minnesota Press 2007

To displace the dialectic of immortality/mortality requires the introduction of a third term, the specter, which cannot be reduced to either spirit or body. Derrida characterizes the specter as being "of the spirit," appearing as "its phantom double."17 As the ghost of spirit, the specter is **neither present nor absent**, neither immortal nor mortal. Spec-trality thus corresponds to the logic of the revenant, that is, to a "body" that can never fully return to itself as a living presence. Irreducible to the construction of racial and sexual others as abject or socially dead, then, spectrality names the condition of being-toward-death to which no-body is immune.18

## Community

Community enshrines face-to-face interaction as the ideal of politics. this illusion kill any effort at a genuinely liebratory democracy. it applies especially well to debate, which is based in part on maintaining a myth of the logos in presence.

Young 90

IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237-38 (1990).

Iris Marion Young (2 January 1949 - 1 August 2006) was Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies [1] and the Human Rights program there. Her research covered contemporary political theory, feminist social theory, and normative analysis of public policy.

The ideal of community as a pure copresence of subjects to one another receives political expression in a vision of political life that privileges local face-to-face direct democracy. Critics of welfare capitalist society repeatedly invoke such a model of small group relations as a political ideal. The anarchist tradition expresses these values most systematically, but they retain their form in other political soils as well. This model of politics as founded in face-to-face relations poses as the alternative to the impersonality, alienation, commodification, and bureaucratization of govern- ance in existing mass societies: The incarnation of this project is the immediate, indeed unmediatcd, community that enters so profoundly into the fashioning of our humanity. This is the community in which we genuinely encounter each other, the public world that is only a bare step above our private world, in short, our towns, neighborhoods, and municipalities. (Bookchin, 1987, p. 267; cf. Manicas, 1974, pp. 246-50; Bay, 1981, chaps. 5 and 6) Several problems arise when a community that privileges face-to-facc relations is taken as the ideal of the polity. The ideal presumes a myth of unmediatcd social relations, and wrongly identifies mediation with alienation. It denies difference in the sense of temporal and spatial distancing. It implies a model of the good society as consisting of decentralized small units which is both unrealistic and politically undesirable, and which avoids the political question of just relations among such decentralized communities. As the above quotation indicates, theorists of community privilege face-to-face relations because they conceive them as immediate. Immediacy is better than mediation because immediate relations have the purity and security longed for in the Kousscauist dream: we arc transparent to one another, purely coprcscnt in the same time and space, close enough to touch, and nothing comes between us to obstruct our vision of one another. This ideal of the immediate coprescnce of subjects, however, is a metaphysical illusion. Even a face-to-face relation between two people is mediated by voice and gesture, spacing and temporality. As soon as a third person enters the interaction the possibility arises of the relation between the first two being mediated through the third, and so on. The mediatio**n** of relations among persons by the speech and actions of other persons is a fundamental condition of sociality. The richness, creativity, diversity, and potential of a society expand with growth in the scope and means of its media, linking persons across time and distance. The greater the time and distance, however, the greater the number of persons who stand between other persons. 1 am not arguing that there is no difference between small groups in which persons relate to one another face-to-facc and other social relations, nor am I denying a unique value to such face-to-face groups. Just as the intimacy of living with a few others in the same household has unique dimensions that arc humanly valuable, so existing with others in communities of mutual regard has specific characteristics of warmth and sharing that arc humanly valuable. There is no question either that burcaucratized capitalist patriarchal society discourages and destroys such commu- nities of mutual friendship, just as it pressures and fragments families. A vision of the good society surely should include institutional arrangements that nurture the specific experience of mutual friendship which only relatively small groups interact- ing in a plurality of contexts can produce. But recognizing the value and specificity of such face-to-face relations is different from privileging them and positing them as a model for the institutional relations of a whole society. In my view, a model of the good society as composed of decentralized, economic- ally self-sufficient face-to-face communities functioning as autonomous political entities does not purify politics, as its proponents think, but rather avoids politics. First, it is wildly Utopian. To bring it into being would require dismantling the urban character of modern society, a gargantuan overhaul of living space, workplaces, placcs of trade and commerce. A model of a transformed society must begin from the material structures that are given to us at this time in history, and in the United States those are large-scale industry and urban centers. More important, however, this model of the good society as usually articulated leaves completely unaddressed the question of how such small communities relate to one another. Frequently the ideal projects a level of self-sufficiency and decentral- ization which suggests that proponents envision few relations among these commu- nities except occasional friendly visits. Surely it is unrealistic, however, to assume that such decentralized communities need not engage in extensive relations of exchange of resources, goods, and culture. Proponents frequently privilege face-to-face relations in reaction to the alienation and domination produced by huge, faceless bureaucracies and corporations, whose actions and decisions affect most people, but arc out of their control. Appeals to community envision more local and direct control. A more participator)' democratic society should indeed encourage active publics at the local levels of neighborhood and workplace. But the important political question is how relations among these locales can be organized so as to foster justice and minimize domination and oppression. Invoking a mystical idea! of community does not address this question, but rather obscures it. Politics must be conceived as a relationship of strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense, relating across time and distance.

the perm still links - ideals of community are inherently anti-urban. they’re based in a nostalgic romanticism that hates the city

Young 90

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Appeals to community are usually antiurba**n**. Much sociological literature diagnoses modern history as a movement to the dangerous bureaucrarized Gesellschaft from the manageable and safe Gemeinschafty nostalgically reconstructed as a world of lost origins (Stein, 1960; Nisbet, 1953). Many others follow Rousseau in romanticizing the ancient polis and the medieval Swiss Burger, deploring the commerce, disorder, and unmanageable mass character of the modern city (Ellison, 1985; cf. Sennett, 1974, chaps. 7-10). Throughout the modern period, the city has often been decried as embodying immorality, artificiality, disorder, and danger - as the site of treasonous conspiracies, illicit sex, crime, deviance, and disease (Mosse, 1985, pp. 32-33,137-38; Gilman, 1985, p. 214). The typical image of the modern city finds it expressing all the disvalues that a reinstantiation of community would eliminate. Yet urbanity is the horizon of the modern, nor to mention the postmodern, condition. Contemporary political theory must accept urbanity as a material given for those who live in advanced industrial societies. Urban relations define the lives not only of those who live in the huge metropolises, but also of those who live in suburbs and large towns. Our social life is structured by vast networks of temporal and spatial mediation among persons, so that nearly everyone depends on the activities of seen and unseen strangers who mediate between oneself and one's associates, between oneself and one's objects of desire. Urbanites find themselves relating geographically to increasingly large regions, thinking little of traveling seventy miles to work or an hour's drive for an evening's entertainment. Most people frequently and casually encounter strangers in their daily activities. The material surroundings and structures available to us define and presuppose urban relation- ships. The very size of populations in our society and most other nations of the world, coupled with a continuing sense of national or ethnic identity with millions of other people, supports the conclusion that a vision of dismantling the city is hope- lessly Utopian.

THE WORD community itself MAPS ONTO PASTORAL ROMANTICISM THAT REJECTS THE DIVERSITY OF THE CITY

POOLE 5

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The difficulty of drawing the conceptual boundaries of any one 'community' within a vast modern city is a symptom of the fact that, as often used politically, the term 'community' is satu- rated with nostalgia for forms of life that no longer exist. If you had to draw a picture of a 'community', you would probably come up with an idealised country village ('It takes a village/ noted Hillary Clinton) of a few hundred inhabitants at most: a place with a square, a tavern, and cheerful farmers, a place where, as in the TV series Cheers, everybody knows your name. Such modes of life are rare in Los Angeles or London. And a homogeneously friendly community is not automatically found in the country any more than it is in the city. So to describe a local area as a 'community' is to express a wish about how the people living there should behave, regardless of how they actually do behave. (Can there be a community of the anti-social?) Used in this way, then, 'community' maps political desire on to geography.

**This is a DA to the aff—**this hostility to the city sustains global wars. maintaining public spaces of dissent within the city is the only possibility of reversing these genocidal logics

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The power of the new military urbanism thesis is that it forces together sites and circuits of militarization that are usually scrutinized in isolation. It achieves this, moreover, by attending to the visceral and material transformations across everyday urban life rather than the abstractions of geopolitics and international relations. Finally, it attends to the fundamental connec¬tions in the contemporary world between cities and urbanization on the one hand and questions of state and non-state political violence on the other. In encompassing the ways in which tech- nophiliac dreams of control and omniscience blend with Foucauldian boomerang effects, political economies of 'security', projections of political violence through the infrastruc¬tural circuits of cities, and the militarization of popular, electronic, material and automo¬bile culture, the new military urbanism thesis reveals with unprecedented clarity how pernicious circuits of militarization operate across a broad swathe. The ways in which the new military urbanism works to colonize the everyday spaces and sites of city life, under all-embracing paradigms that project life itself to be little but war, and within a bound¬less and unending 'battlespace', emerge starkly. Many contemporary military and 'secu-rity' theories and doctrines now conclude that 'war' is now 'everywhere and every-thing. It is large and small. It has no bound-aries in time and space. Life itself is war' (Agre, 2001). Working though xenophobic and deeply anti-urban views of the world, which continuously telescope between conventional North-South binaries, such perspectives see the world through techno- philiac cross-hairs; they automatically trans¬late difference into othering, othering into targeting, and targeting into violence. Such logics, moreover, have been shown to be constituted through circuits of popular culture, from car culture to video games, film and science fiction, through to the deepening crossovers between war, entertainment and weapon design. What emerges is a stark challenge to all those concerned with the right to the city, and the future of democratic urban life, at the start of this quintessentially urban century. For the challenge now is to forge a synoptic and multifaceted politics, which itself embraces highly fluid new media technologies and telescopes across global North-South divides, to systematically erode the key pillars of the new military urbanism. Such a politics, though, must engage first with the ways in which ideas of an 'urban public domain' must move beyond traditional notions that they encompass both media content and geographical spaces exempt from proprietary control which combine to 'form our common aesthetic, cultural and intellec¬tual landscape' (Zimmermann, 2007). Rather than permanent, protected zones of urbanity or 'publicness', organized hierarchically by key gatekeepers, transnational urban life is now characterized by constantly emerging public domains which are highly fluid, plural- ized and organized by interaction between many producers and consumers (Zimmer-mann, 2007). The new public domains, through which challenges to the new military urbanism can be sustained, must forge collab¬orations and connections across distance and difference. They must materialize new publics, and create new countergeographic spaces. Ironically, they must use the very same media and control technologies that the mili¬taries, and the transnational architecture of security states, are using so perniciously in their attempts to pre-emptively lock-down democratic politics (Zimmermann, 2007).

## DA

Regulations on detention require huge military investments that trade-off with effective war-fighting—causes failure in Iraq and Afghanistan

Ford, 10

(Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, currently serving as the Staff Judge Advocate, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, “Keeping Boumediene off the Battlefield: Examining Potential Implications of the Boumediene v. Bush Decision to the Conduct of United States Military Operations,” 30 Pace L. Rev. 396, Winter, Lexis)

Programmatically and institutionally, extension would require a re-evaluation of the DoD's policies, regulations, training, and organization. Currently, all military personnel are trained to the Geneva standard under the DoD Law of War Program. n38 This program ensures that service members are trained in and abide by the international legal norms of warfare. Would the DoD implement a similar program to ensure compliance with domestic laws during combat operations, including detention operations? And, if so, should it be separate from the Law of War Program or integrated into it? A progressive extension of Boumediene may require service members in combat to abide by constitutional provisions normally applicable to domestic law enforcement personnel. Such an extension would require a massive training and education program to be implemented department-wide. This training might include instruction on the court-directed domestic laws that might now be applicable, essentially a shifting body of criminal law for the battlefield. In [\*405] implementing this new standard, both the DoD and the military might be required to implement several new procedures, including: training packages for new entrants at basic training installations, annual refresher training, formalized procedures for integration into major military training exercises and actual military operations, a reporting procedure for violations, and benchmarks for methods of effectiveness. The International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") might choose to monitor U.S. forces not only for compliance with international law but also for compliance with our applicable domestic laws. The DoD would be interested in the ICRC's new focus area and would need to implement procedures to address these new areas of international scrutiny. As the DoD attempts to operationalize Boumediene, it must consider the new concept of how to support a federal case while concomitantly conducting military operations. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, noted that the Boumediene holding "sets our military commanders the impossible task of proving to a civilian court, under whatever standards this Court devises in the future, that evidence supports the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner." n39 Practically speaking, this is already happening in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia as the Guantanamo detainees' habeas cases progress. n40 The Supreme Court is not, as Justice Scalia noted, establishing the rules under which these cases will proceed. That task has fallen on the district court judges, specifically Senior Judge Thomas F. Hogan, who has been charged with establishing general rules for the administration and management of most of these cases. n41 [\*406] These rules and procedures will be vitally important not only for the process, but also for the DoD and combat soldiers whose actions they will dictate. Courts will create, and lawyers argue endlessly about, such important matters as the definition of "enemy combatant," the standard of proof for this yet-to-be defined term, the admissibility of evidence, the scope and breadth of exclusionary rules, presumptions afforded to government evidence, whether the presence of the detainee is required, access to government witnesses, the extent of government disclosures of exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, n42 and a host of other procedural and substantive issues. Every issue that may arise in a federal criminal case will have to be addressed, interpreted, decided, and applied to the current and future unique enemy prisoner habeas actions. These procedures create daunting tasks. Enter CSI: Kandahar. Extending the Boumediene holding would require detailed procedures for the collection, preservation, and maintenance of "evidence." Normally, the military treats information regarding enemy captives as battlefield information or intelligence. Military personnel process this information, important to the conduct of military operations, through intelligence channels. Intelligence analysts and commanders use the information to determine enemy strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and locations important to the commander on the ground. Treating captured enemy information as evidence in a federal case would require an entirely new method of collecting and processing intelligence. More likely, the DoD and the intelligence agencies would choose to establish an entirely separate but parallel system to process and sanitize battlefield intelligence information for transmittal to federal courts because of the significant risk to intelligence sources and methods. The DoD may be forced to address these federal evidence requirements. Standards may have to be established, beginning with procedures to determine what constitutes the [\*407] equivalent of probable cause to detain, and including procedures for, inter alia, the seizure and collection of evidence, chain of custody, evidence storage and maintenance, evidence authentication, and witness availability. n43 This may, in turn, require procedures to formalize investigations, including a requirement of a pseudo-criminal case file for every detained enemy. Certainly, service members do not have the training to make and prove a federal case. Service members on the ground are now familiar with basic evidence collection requirements, and great strides have been taken in Iraq and Afghanistan to formalize information collection resulting from raids. n44 Site exploitation teams and specially trained personnel have assisted in gathering and maintaining site intelligence information, which may later be used as evidence, normally in an Iraqi or Afghani court. But imagine if every military operation required a police-like crime scene analysis, with the [\*408] collection of evidence to be used in a federal court. Soldiers simply cannot conduct such an undertaking, nor should they be required to. Military law enforcement personnel are a limited asset on the battlefield, busily investigating alleged misconduct by military personnel, contract fraud, and the deaths of service members. The DoD would be hard pressed to meet new stringent investigative and evidentiary requirements. The DoD may have to adjust its force structure and dramatically increase the capacity of the services' law enforcement investigative agencies, a precarious undertaking for a military already stretched thin. Or, perhaps the DoD would create a new habeas investigative agency, uniformed and/or civilian, to accompany forces on the battlefield. One solution is to use another federal law enforcement agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("F.B.I."), to augment military forces, similar to the manner in which the U.S. Coast Guard augments U.S. Navy operations during law enforcement actions at sea. n45

Nuclear war

Morgan 7

(Stephen John, former National Executive Officer of the British Labour Party, his responsibilities included international relations, ethnic minority work, women’s issues, finance, local government and organization, he specialised particularly in international crisis situations spending long periods working in Belfast, in efforts to overcome sectarian strife and terrorism, former Director of WIC, a research and publishing company based in London, he went to live in Budapest during the Gorbachov period from where he helped build opposition groups in the underground in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and East Germany, Stephen left active politics in the early 1990 and came to live in Brussels, where he established and managed his own publishing company, has lived and worked in more than 27 different countries, including underground political work during the troubles in in Northern Ireland and war in Yugoslavia, http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639)

Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not advance without the support or acquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, the Taliban is drawing on backing from the Pashtun tribes from whom they originate. The southern and eastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover, not only have they not benefited at all from the Allied occupation, but it is increasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the country outside Kabul has seen little improvement in its circumstances. The conditions for unrest are ripe and the Taliban is filling the vacuum. The Break-Up of Afghanistan? However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside of the powerful Pashtun tribes. Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key minorities, such as Tajiks and Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making new inroads. They will fight the Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the NATO and US forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied ground support. The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of liberation against the Soviets and the Afghanistan civil war. Mobilized they count for a much stronger adversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible that, while they won’t fight for the current government or coalition forces, they will certainly resist any new Taliban rule. They may decide to withdraw to their areas in the north and west of the country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves, excepting a frightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets. Squeezed by facing fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban terrorism in Kabul, sooner or later, a “Saigon-style” evacuation of US and Allied forces could be in the cards. The net result could be the break-up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a southern and eastern area, which would include the two key cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. « Pastunistan?» The Taliban themselves, however may decide not to take on the Northern Alliance and fighting may concentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an agreement regardless of US and Allied plans or preferences. The Taliban may claim the name Afghanistan or might opt for “Pashtunistan” – a long-standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along the ungovernable border regions inside Pakistan. It could not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away of the Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state, encompassing some 18 million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although the Pashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national consciousness and the idea of an independent Pashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was cut in two by the “Durand Line”, a totally artificial border between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevilling relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout their history, and with India before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead to sporadic wars and border clashes between the two countries and occasional upsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasement President Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to avoid further alienating Pashtun tribes there and head–off a potential separatist movement in Pakistan, which could develop from the Taliban’s offensive across the border in Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly the same problems as the US and Allies in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost in Iraq. Evidently, he could not win and has settled instead for an attempted political solution. When he agreed the policy of appeasement and virtual self-rule for North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there was outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his country against civil war and disintegration. In his own words, what he fears most is, the « Talibanistation » of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame the already fierce fundamentalist and other separatist movement across his entire country. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war to engulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the nationalist struggle in Kashmir, an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings in the main cities. There is also a large Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular. Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and Intelligence Services is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda central leadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not captured or killed Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with Bin Laden’s severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own head in Pakistan. At best he takes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then at the peril of the chagrin of the people and his own military and secret service. The Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. What is at stake in "the half-forgotten war" in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America's capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of «Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!

And, Morgan says it draws in China and Russia:

Russia

Bostrom 2(Nick Bostrom, 2002. Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale. "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

**3) All lives infinitely valuable—only ethical option is maximizing number saved**

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I *may* still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.

War turns structural violence

Bulloch 8

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 But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

Their conception of violence is reductive and can’t be solved

Boulding 77

 Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung

Author(s): Kenneth E. BouldingReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86Published

 Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 – March 18, 1993) was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher.[1][2] He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics and social science.

 He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.

 Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the systenm rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the two; one is Ithe increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand lincreasing strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between percepti'on and reality can be very large and resistant to change. However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one unkind commenltator as anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty cultures. But the dynamics lof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have d'one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

# 1NR

## FW

They don’t meet – topical affs have to simulate federal government action – prefer Ericson – it’s a holistic interpretation of “USFG should” and establishes a clear threshold.

Ambiguity is a reason to err neg – T is a big time investment. We shouldn’t have to corner them into defending a plan just to get back to square one – the only neg advantage is time.

Plan ambiguity links to clash – distracts 1NC attention, creates shallow debate and encourages run and gun.

Debate should be about process and product – their impact focus not only rigs the game, it also means you should vote neg on presumption

Major, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University, 2012

(Mark, *Where Do We Go From Here?*, Kindle Edition, Locations 91-130)

More than seventy years ago, the economist John Maynard Keynes remarked that the ideas of intellectuals were “more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” 1 As technology continues to enable greater access to ideas around the world, the power of intellectuals is greater than ever. And given that the world is full of crushing poverty, sexism, uneven development, environmental degeneration, religious fanaticism, racism, and imperialism, the need for intellectuals to inspire the radical imagination by championing principles of economic and social justice, democracy, and universality is also greater than ever. Frederick Douglass correctly asserted that “power concedes nothing without a demand” because progress, in any form, requires work. However, **political visions are required to guide that struggle**. This is the aim of the book. Imaginations and visions matter. They point forward. They provoke thought and challenge underlying assumptions. The current political landscape in the United States consists of rampant economic, gender, and racial inequalities, **shoddy infrastructure**, declining public engagement, hyper-consumption and individualism, and politics that emphasize the trivial. Much of this is a product of the corrosive effects of neoliberalism and the new conservatism. 2 While the 2008 presidential campaign seemed to indicate disillusionment with this public philosophy and political project, it certainly did not translate into immediate success for progressives. In fact, the current political environment is, in part, a consequence of the Left’s inability to forge new paradigms for democratic life. As a result, we are experiencing the decline of the radical imagination. The paucity of the radical imagination should be viewed as a crisis to those who value substantive democratic politics. **The Left has yet to understand the consequences of defining itself solely by what it is against rather than what it is for**. Unquestionably, **identifying problems is crucial**. However, locating the problem does not necessarily render the identification of solutions. **The failure to search for solutions is irresponsible and dangerous as it negates agency for action and leads to a society of cynics**. Though recent criticism regarding the value of social sciences is superficial, there is a legitimate concern relating to the degree of scholarly engagement with politics. In the classic essay, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” Noam Chomsky argues that those in privileged positions like academia have the moral obligation to tell the truth and expose lies. 3 It is in that spirit that this edited volume seeks to revive another responsibility that academics have largely neglected— inspiring the radical imagination. This collection challenges leading thinkers and practitioners to put forth a new political project for democratic life. Recent literature on radical politics and policy solutions is few and far between. Commentators usually focus on a single issue, especially economic reforms. 4 While these contributions are invaluable, they are limited in that people do not lead single-issue lives. Thus, this edited volume presents a multiple-issue approach to the future of radical politics, speaking with many voices and from numerous vantage points as the Left is anything but monolithic. Furthermore, these radical policies are situated in the context of the current political environment to deal with real-life problems. This edited volume seeks to provide a first approximation, to point forward, to develop a framework that guides political action. The driving principle that informs Where Do We Go from Here? is what Stephen Eric Bronner and Michael J. Thompson call “rational radicalism.” This is “a practical enterprise that insists on resurrecting the link between ideas and reality, principles and interests, theory and practice.” Rational radicalism is equally concerned with “constraining the arbitrary exercise of institutional power whether on the level of economics, politics, or culture.” 5 This collection is **an unequivocal renunciation to the Margaret Thatchers of the world declaring that** “**There is no alternative**” **to the reigning political project**. It is also **a response to Left-oriented scholarship**, lectures, and conferences **that vigorously discuss political problems but expend minute energy on solutions**. This project gathers those who do imagine the possible. It asks the
leading engaged scholars and activists, “Where do we go from here?” At the heart of this book is the fundamental question: “What is a good society and how do we move closer to one?” Another way to look at this edited volume is to consider it as a call to action, especially among those in academia. **Though essential**, **ruthless criticism is not enough**. **The hard work lies in developing solutions and it is the solutions that are lacking**. Indeed, coming up with constructive solutions is a daunting task but I was encouraged to find that these contributors were up to the challenge.

No internal link – just because they can make a good metaphor doesn’t mean it’s got any access to truth

**Goldman 01** (Michael, Dept. Philosophy @ Miami U. Ohio, Journal of Value Inquiry, “A Transcendental Defense of Speciesism” 35:59-69, Springer)

While we may agree that racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of discrimination against human beings are abhorrent, it is not the case that the only reason to reject these forms of discrimination is the principle of equal consideration of interests that Singer advances. It is not even a compelling reason. All that Singer has shown is that one principle sufficient for rejecting racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression is a principle of equal consideration of interests. He has not shown that it is the only principle that can generate that moral conclusion. There are other principles that co-exist with and explain our intuitions about various forms of discrimination against non-dominant human beings, but they do not always apply to non-human animals. While we can easily grant that Singer’s principle applies to non-human, sentient animals as well as it does to human beings, it does not follow that whatever consideration is morally obligatory with respect to all human beings will be similarly obligatory with respect to non-human sentient animals. Singer provides no reason to think that it is that principle alone that can justify our condemnation of the oppression of non-dominant human beings.

Reject this metaphorical approach – it’s pragmatically dangerous and prone to miscommunication – vote neg on presumption

**Hart 06**

(Hart, Geoff, September 2006, “Editorial: Overextending metaphors”, Scientific Communication, Vol. 13 No. 1, http://www.stcsig.org/sc/newsletter/html/2006-3.htm)FS

One problem with metaphors is that they can be carried too far: because a metaphor is only a simulation of reality, it does not precisely or fully match that reality, and each mismatch can potentially lead to misunderstanding. Consider, for example, the trash can used to delete files in most graphical user interfaces. The Macintosh interface designers who chose this metaphor to describe how users discard files chose an obvious and effective metaphor because just about everyone understands how a trash can works. But unfortunately, a great many users took that metaphor places its designers never intended. When this interface choice was first made, many Macintosh owners used their computer at home or in a small graphics studio rather than in a large corporate workplace, and thus used their experience with trash cans to make the following assumption: "When I throw something in the trash, it's going to stay there forever, or at least until I can persuade someone to take out the trash." Unfortunately, the first implementation of the Macintosh trash can automatically emptied the trash when you shut down your computer. That was clearly a problem for anyone who expected the discarded files to still be there waiting for them the next day when they turned on their computer. So many people complained about losing precious files (never mind that these files should never have been in the trash in the first place) that Apple changed the interface. Version two of the trash can accounted for this problem by leaving deleted files in the trash until someone specifically told the computer to empty the trash. That's a great idea, except by then, the world had moved on and more Macintosh users were using their computer in the workplace, where a janitor could be relied on to empty the trash each night after the workers went home. Since that wasn’t the way the software actually worked, the inevitable consequence was that files accumulated in the trash until they took over the entire computer; in other cases, people deleted files that were potentially embarrassing, not realizing the files were still there to be discovered by anyone who went poking around in the trash. Clearly, another small interface failure; unlike a spouse or roommate, the Macintosh operating system doesn't remind you to empty your trash periodically. A future iteration of the interface will presumably strike the right balance between versions one and two by retaining information in the trash until you specifically delete it, but also by periodically providing a gentle reminder to empty the trash. This example illustrates an important rule for successful use of metaphors: you must strive to understand the consequences of the metaphor by asking yourself what users will think when they encounter it, and thus, how they can be expected to behave. Where some behaviors will prove damaging, we need to clearly communicate the problem and its solution in our documentation. Better still, we need to report the problem to the designers of a product so they can take appropriate measures to protect users from their own instincts. Another significant problem with metaphors is that they rely on certain assumptions, and those assumptions bias how we think about reality. One of the most famous (some might say infamous) relates to a favorite device of science fiction writers: time travel. Science fiction writer René Barjavel, in pondering the implications of time travel, wondered about what quickly became known as the grandfather paradox: What would happen if you traveled back in time to a date before your parents were born, and killed one of your grandparents? Clearly, this means that one of your parents would never have lived, and thus could not have conceived you; the result, a few years into the future, is that you would never exist to return and kill that grandparent. But because you did not kill the grandparent, your parent would be born, leading to your birth and your subsequent desire to travel back in time and become a murderer. Round and round we go until we give up in frustration and choose a convenient way to avoid the problem—declare that time travel is impossible. Whether or not time travel really is impossible, that would be an unfortunate choice, because paradoxes are crucially important in science: they reveal when we don't understand a process nearly as clearly as we thought we did. If we did understand fully, there would be no paradox. The grandfather paradox presupposes that we understand how the physics of time travel would really work, namely that there is an indestructible connection between the past and the future and that changing the past would inevitably change the future. Should we stop there, no one would ever examine time travel in more detail to see whether other possibilities exist, and that would rob us of a much richer understanding of our world. One consequence might be the elimination of the branch of mathematics that examines the "many worlds" hypothesis, in which a whole new universe is hypothesized to spring into existence as soon as we change the past. In the case of the grandfather paradox, this means that two universes (one in which you are born and one in which you are not) would move forward through time from that point onwards. In writing a story, I once proposed a different metaphor: that time is more like a VHS tape, and that if you go back and change something, this is no different from recording over an old program you've already watched. The future (the part of the tape after the new recording) isn't changed because you haven't overwritten it yet. Both metaphors may be entirely incorrect (as seems likely based on our modern understanding of physics), but their correctness is not the important issue here: what's important is how each metaphor biases the way we think and predetermines the kind of analysis we're prepared to consider. Thus, a second rule of successful use of metaphors is that we must take great pains to understand the constraints they place on our thoughts. If we're aware of those constraints, we can attempt to work around them; if not, we won't make that effort, and that may prevent us from making crucial new discoveries. A third problem arises if we oversimplify our description of reality and thus neglect key issues. Consider, for example, the issue of fighting forest fires. Because mature forests develop over time spans longer than the typical human life, it's natural for us to think of them as eternal. Because we now understand the value of "untouched" nature, the inevitable consequence is that we want to preserve old forests and protect them against fires. This belief is epitomized in the public consciousness by Smokey the Bear and the "only you can prevent forest fires" slogan. Although it's true that human-originated fires are a serious problem, and should often be fought, the often part is neglected. In particular, the limited worldview offered by Smokey the Bear ignores the fact that fires are a crucial part of natural ecosystems and that some forest ecosystems only develop after fires, and will eventually disappear from the landscape if natural fires are not allowed to burn. The more general point is captured by the cliché that "the only constant is change". Ecosystems, including forests, aren't truly stable; instead, they exhibit what is known as metastability, in which what seems stable from the outside is actually changing continuously. In a forest, old trees die, unlucky trees are felled by lightning or windstorms, and new trees sprout to take their place. Rather than perfect stability, a mature forest is in equilibrium: individual components change, but the overall ecosystem stays close to its current state. Yet these equilibrium states also change; if the environment changes, or if disturbances such as fire are prevented, natural processes will lead the ecosystem to change into something new, and a new equilibrium will develop. For example, in the absence of fire, boreal jack pine forests will be replaced by shade-tolerant decidous trees that grow in the limited light beneath the forest canopy. As the older trees die, they are replaced by younger decidous trees, which produce so much shade when mature that the pines can no longer survive. The problem with describing ecosystems as stable is that it conceals the important concept of dynamic equilibrium, and the consequence that any equilibrium will eventually shift to a new type of equilibrium. This means we can never preserve a specific ecosystem in its current state forever, and that we probably should not try. Instead, it is more important to preserve the conditions that allow a given site to evolve naturally from one equilibrium state to another ("succession"), while altering conditions elsewhere to permit the development of the desired ecosystem. Communicating more of the complexity provides the necessary bounds on the metaphor, permits a more complete understanding, and lets us choose wiser management strategies. A third rule for successful use of metaphors is thus that we must identify critical points of failure—places where the metaphor is insufficiently complete that it leads our audience astray—and must provide the missing complexity that will prevent this misunderstanding. We must recognize that the purpose of a metaphor is to facilitate understanding, but once that understanding exists, we must build on it to provide any missing details that explain the true complexity. As scientific communicators, we often resort to metaphors because of their power to facilitate understanding. But to use metaphors successfully, we must be conscious of the problems I've identified in this essay: we must identify mismatches with reality, implicit and explicit assumptions, and places where the metaphor is too simplistic. Understanding these three problems lets us help our audience to understand the mismatches between the metaphor and reality, remind them of the assumptions behind the metaphor so that they can challenge those assumptions and make conceptual breakthroughs, and recognize where we have oversimplified a complex reality. That oversimplification is only acceptable if it provides an initial understanding that we can subsequently build upon to create a deeper, richer understanding.